

# Impact of Migrations on Local Economy and Social Networks:

Case Study in Behsud I, II and Bamyan Markaz districts

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Central Highlands Programme (CHP) is common initiative implemented by a consortium of three French NGOs (GERES, MADERA and SOLIDARITES INTERNATIONAL) funder by the Agency for French Development (AFD). The general objective of the programme is to increase the living standards and quality of life of rural mountainous populations by promoting balanced rural development and preservation of natural resources. The 3.5 years programme was launched in March 2014 in two provinces of the Central Afghanistan: Bamyán and Maydan-Wardak.



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## Definitions and Acronyms

Âshhâr	Traditional community work, at a village level, realized without any money transaction (mutual aid)
Behsud I	Hissa-e-Awal Behsud
Behsud II	Behsud Markazi
Bukhari	Traditional heating and cooking stove, cylindrical
Dehqan	Farmer, used for land owner farming his own land and sharecropper
Djerib	Surface measure unit corresponding to 0.2 hectares
Emigrant	A person who leaves his own country in order to settle permanently in another one
Farmer	Person working on someone else's land, bringing material or farm inputs
Grab (« Grao »)	System of mortgage used in Afghanistan. In Behsud (and rural areas), people generally mortgage their land.
Hazârajat	Current afghan name for the Central Highlands area, mainly settled by Hazâra people
Hazâras	People from Hazârajat. Various theories circulate about their origin (Mongols, Turco-mongols, Chagataï mongols from central Asia etc.)
Hezâr-Bôz	Kuchis breeders of Nangarhar (eastern province). They move up to summer grazing grounds in the area of Qol-e-Khish and Ab-e-Noqre (North-east of Behsud I district)
Immigrant	A person who comes to live permanently in a foreign country
Ismaili septimain shiism	A Shiite sect whose adherents believe that Ismaïl, son of the sixth Imam, was the rightful seventh imam (Musa al Kazim is the seventh for duodecimal). Agha Khan is considered as the direct lineage of Ismaïl and recognized as being original imam.
Kuchis	From Persian verb "Kutch kardan" (to leave / to escape). Pashtun nomadic tribes.
Lalmi	Rainfed cultures. Most of them in Behsud are occupied by wheat, with residual cultures of barely. They often are located on hill's slopes, and cause the degeneration of pastures
Manteqa	Non-administratively defined area within the districts, with common characteristics on social, climatic or geographic sights
Qizel-Bâsh	Descendant of the military troops installed in Afghanistan by Nader Shah Afshâr, shah of Persia, during his conquest of Delhi's sultanate (18th century). Qizel-Bâsh are Shiite.
Ser	Unit measure for weight. 1 ser is equivalent to 7 Kg
Seyyed	Direct descendant of the prophet Muhammad in Sunnite Islam. In Shiite Islam: descendant of the prophet through the filiation of Ali, fourth

	Calife, nephew and son-in-law Muhammad. Seyyed in Hazârajat are Shiite.
Share-cropper	Person working on someone else's land, bringing only the workforce
Shiite duodecimal	– A member of one of the two great religious divisions of Islam that regards Ali, the son-in-law of Muhammad, as the legitimate successor of Muhammad, and disregards the three caliphs who succeeded him. They consider the 12th imam (Al Mahdi - Messiah) as the last one.
Sunnite	A member of one of the two great religious divisions of Islam regarding the first four caliphs as legitimate successors of Muhammad and stressing the importance of Sunna as a basis for law.
Tchai-Khâna	Restaurant and tea house. Literally "House of Tea"
Uluswal	Person in charge of the administrative authority of the Uluswali
Uluswali	District – administrative subdivision of afghan provinces
AFS	Afghanis - Afghan currency
AREU	Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit
CHP	Central Highland Programme
GERES	Groupe Energies Renouvelables, Environnement et Solidarités; implementing partner of CHP
IOM	International Office for Migrations
MADERA	Mission d'Aide au Développement des Economies Rurales en Afghanistan; implementing partner of CHP
UNHCR	United Nation High Commissioner for Refugees





## 1 Introduction

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### 1.1 1.1 Context of the area

#### 1.1.1 1.1.1 Desk review

- DUPEIGNE Bernard, ROSSIGNOL Gilles, *Le carrefour afghan, Folio actuel, 2002* -

The authors describe many aspects of the afghan multi-ethnic society, rooted in a history made of peoples and commercial movements. Afghanistan's situation, as a crossroad between Indian and European worlds, is enlightened as a way to understand the current social networks and the impact of conflicts and history on them. The book also depicts accurately the Afghan ethnic groups and minorities. The book is not particularly dedicated to the situation of Hazâras people, but is a great help to understand the social and economic relationships between various populations through the country's history.

- ECHAVEZ C., BAGAPORO J., PILONGO L., AZADMANESH S, *Why do children undertake unaccompanied journey ?*, AREU-UNHCR, 2014 -

This report is an outcome of a collaborative research project by UNHCR and the Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU) to examine the specific circumstances and motivations leading Afghan children to travel to Europe and other industrialized countries. This issue of children undertaking unaccompanied journeys abroad has been the focus of increasing attention, in light of the significant numbers of unaccompanied children arriving in Europe and the child protection concerns raised by this risky, and often irregular, travel. Afghanistan is one of the most notable countries of origin of children undertaking unaccompanied journeys abroad.

- IBRAHIMI Niamatullah, *Shift and drift in Hazâra ethnic consciousness. The impact of migrations, Crossroads Asia, 2012*<sup>1</sup> -

"Niamatullah Ibrahim presents in the fifth volume of the Crossroads Asia Working Paper Series the results of his six-month Crossroads Asia Fellowship at the Center for Development Studies (ZEFL) at Freie Universität Berlin. He analyzes the evolution of an ethnic and political group identity of the Hazâra of central Afghanistan in historical perspective. The author shows how recurrent conflicts, ethno-religious prosecutions and related processes of mobility and migration have shaped and facilitated the development of a joint ethno-political Hazâra identity"<sup>2</sup>

This report has been used as a base to confirm / infirm the question of Hazâras identity and consciousness, and then look at migrations on different sides. The idea was to make comparison between the process underlined by the author and the reality of migrations in Behsud. Do the migrations occur because of particular circumstances and without any strategy? Or, on the contrary, does this political and social consciousness takes place in the stated migratory flows?

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<sup>1</sup>Available at: <http://past.is/z1koG>

<sup>2</sup>Frei Universität Berlin, <http://past.is/z1noS>

- MONSUTTI Alessandro, *Guerres et migrations. Réseaux sociaux et stratégies économiques des Hazâras d'Afghanistan*, édition de l'institut d'ethnologie, Neuchâtel – édition de la maison des sciences de l'homme, 2004 -

This book has been used as a baseline, as it perfectly tackles the topic of this study. The fact that it has been written in 2004 also allowed us to make comparison between the situation during Taliban and just after their fall. We built the following hypothesis that we tried to confirm through the field investigations:

- There are various reasons for Hazâras migrations in the recent history. Is this typology still comparable today?
- Seasonality: the migrations are largely described as being part of seasonal movements, notably in young men's population for work purposes.
- Destination of migrants is described as depending on circumstances, in Afghanistan but also in the surroundings countries where Hazâras are used to migrate (Pakistan, Iran). Are those patterns still ongoing, or do they need to be updated?
- Social and economic networks: It is shown that war and migrations do not completely destroy the social and economic networks and solidarities among Hazâras population. It was interesting to figure out if the current practices and relationships between migrants and non-migrants confirm this trend.

- MOUSAVI Sayed Askar, *The Hazâras of Afghanistan, an historical, cultural, economic and politic study*, St Martin's press, 1997 -

This book makes a contribution in Afghanistan studies. It also directly confronts the taboo subject of an Afghan sense of national identity, a crucial concept in the resolution of Afghanistan's current crisis. The history of the place of Hazâras in the society is also described.

For this purpose, it was also interesting for us to meet with the author in Kabul University and discuss with him about the changes and evolution of Hazâras situation since.


- UNHCR FU, *Briefing notes on Behsud's situation*, 2015 -

This note was particularly interesting as it describes the consequences of the seasonal conflict in Behsud with Kuchis (number of IDPs, typology). It also provides accurate figures of the displaced families since 2007.

### 1.1.2 History of Hazârajat since 1842

Until the middle of the XIX<sup>th</sup> century, Hazârajat was depending neither on Kabul emirate, nor on any other local political authority. The prevailing tribal system was regularly harmed by clan's conflicts. However, tribal affiliation and a common reference to more or less mythical ancestors allowed a kind of cohesion. The title of "Mir" designated important valleys lords / landlords and passed on from father to son.

This area may be represented by the following map, showing that Hazârajat is constituted by many provinces (entirely or partially). It is nothing but an historical location of Hazâras as there is no formal acknowledgement<sup>3</sup>.



Map of Hazârajat

Dost Mohammad Khan (1842-1863<sup>4</sup>) was the first to impair this large autonomy of the region, putting Bamyan and surroundings area under Kabul authority. After him, Abdul-Rahman Khan (1880-1901)<sup>5</sup> conquered the entire Hazârajat. The 1891-1893 military campaign was brutal and exacerbated religious disagreements. Entire parts of Hazârajat were emptied and people then flee to the current Pakistan, to Iran, in Central Asia and in the region of Mâzar-e-Sharif. This tragedy is still in the mind of Hazâra people, be they member of diaspora or still inhabitants of the country.

To compensate the exodus of those populations, the central authority opened the area to Pashtuns nomadic Kuchis, of which some clans were already living in the area. The use of money increased, as they were nomadic breeders but also merchants. Indebtedness of local people allowed Kuchis to corner a large number of cultivated lands. Former owners were maintained in the area as sharecroppers or farmers<sup>6</sup>.

The Mirs then lost their traditional power and became intermediaries between local communities and government, which became more and more influent. Though, Mirs were allowed to keep the property of their lands. Nowadays, the “Mir” title nearly disappeared and has been replaced by “Khan”, a name given to any rich person.

Along the XX<sup>th</sup> century, Hazâras people were marginalized, on economic and political points of view. In addition to ostracism, bullying against Hazâras caused number of local revolts, repressed by the government. As a consequence, numerous leaders were killed and many poor farmers migrated to Kabul and reinforced the Hazâras community in cities. Following

<sup>3</sup> Nowadays, Hazâra people live in many other places or cities in the country

<sup>4</sup> Reigning time is mentioned

<sup>5</sup> ditto

<sup>6</sup>See definition for differences

this, and because of the increase of “Hazâra identity” feelings<sup>7</sup>, King Zaher Shah granted law in favor of Hazâra people. But Hazâra people are still claiming for their rights, since the end of the XIX<sup>th</sup> century to the present day.

During soviet occupation (1979-1989) Hazâraajat was not particularly targeted and did not endure the consequences of the conflict like the eastern part of Afghanistan did. The region however turned to be insecure because of conflicts between local parties and warlords. The creation of Hezb-e-Wahdat (around 1995) due to the action of young people back from Iran calmed down the situation and allowed the rise of a kind of unity.

*“Lastly, the rise of ethnicity and ethnic consciousness among the Hazâras are both a consequence and indication of the failure and crisis of nation-state system in Afghanistan as well as ideologies such as political Islamism and Marxism in reforming and reconstituting an alternative political system as opposed to the model of Amir Abdur Rahman Khan that transformed ethno-religious boundaries as basis of political mobilization<sup>8</sup>”*

After the departure of soviets in 1989, and due the unstable political period in Kabul, Kuchis transhumant came back to Hazâraajat, claiming for reestablishment of the pastoral system set up by Abdul-Rahman in 1893. The Kuchis landlords also pushed for the reimbursement of the unpaid use of the land by Hazâras sharecropper during decades of war. Because of this, Hazâraajat little by little got isolated and closed upon itself.

Talibans emerged in the country in 1994 but they hardly entered in Hazâraajat in 1998 after Mâzar-e-Sharif fell. Hazâraajat has been suffering their presence and this marks the beginning of the second important mass exodus in the recent history of Hazâraajat and Behsud<sup>9</sup>.

Talibans left the area when winter came and entrusted the power to “local” Talibans. The situation was then easier to stand for Hazâra people than it has been in other part of Afghanistan. However, many people have left at the beginning of the conflict, most of them in Pakistan (Quetta) or Iran. The end of Mollah Omar’s government time in 2001 reinforced the unity movement, born in the 60’s and strengthened in the 90’s in all the country, of Hazâras people,. After the election of president Karzaï, many Hazâras people became members of parliament and now carry the political demands at a national level.

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<sup>7</sup>About Hazâra identity, see Niamatullah Imbrahimi, *Shift and drift in Hazara ethnic consciousness. The impact of migrations*, Crossroads Asia, 2012. pp 17-18

<sup>8</sup> Ditto, p18

<sup>9</sup>Cf. part 2.1. this episode is still very present in Behsud’s people mind

### 1.1.3 Geography and population

#### 1.1.3.1 The Wardak province

Wardak province<sup>10</sup> is located on the southern side of Koh-e-Baba mountain chain (5,060m) and west of Paghman mountain chain (4,970m). From north to south, altitude decreases from 3,500 (average altitude of piedmonts) to 1,200 meters in Jighatu area. It is surrounded by Bamyan (north-east), Parwan (east), Kaboul (south-east), Logar (south) and Ghazni (south-west) provinces.



The Koh-e-Baba Mountain chain (background of the picture) is a natural separation between Behsud and the largest part of Hazârajat

Wardak is located on the water divide of two important basins:

- Helmand river (source located in Behsud I district) ;
- Kabul river and its tributary, Logar river

Economy of Wardak is mostly relying on agriculture, with the main resources being:

- Lower parts: irrigated agriculture (one harvest per year), important production of apple and apricot, winter wheat crops and alfalfa.
- Upper parts: spring wheat crops, alfalfa and barley, forestry (aspen and poplars) until 2.500 meters, livestock (ovine, caprine and bovine)

The economy is also based on transportation companies and road services. Furthermore, the province recently knew the restart of renovation and development works, interrupted in 1978.

Behsud I and II districts are located in the north of the province, and due to their position on the south side of Koh-e-Baba, form the south-eastern part of Hazârajat. They fully occupy the superior parts of Helmand and Kajab River. In the south of Behsud district, Kajab River is a tributary of Logar River. Nearly 50% of the area of both districts is made of a large, strongly eroded granite massif (altitude between 2.300 and 3.000 m, highest peak at 4.252 m). Large agro-pastoral areas combined with complex remote valleys networks are characteristics of landforms.

Behsud<sup>11</sup> is an agro-ecological area with an arid to semi-arid continental climate, typical of Central Asia. It receives few rainfalls (200 mm per year in average). Most of them are

<sup>10</sup> See annex 1

<sup>11</sup>In this report, "Behsud" refers to both districts

snowfalls, which occur from November to March. The temperature variation is from -15 / -25° Celsius in December to 20 / 28° in July and August.

Behsud is then a particular area, as it is separated of the main Hazârajat's territory by the Koh-e-Baba Mountain. Furthermore, it is directly in contact with Pashtun areas of Wardak and of eastern Afghanistan. This has to be kept in mind as many phenomena in Behsud are linked with this specific location.

### 1.1.3.2 Populations and settlement in Wardak

Pashtun settlement is dominant up to 2.500 meters to the north. Beyond this, life conditions change and the area is settled with different kind of population: Hazâras, Tadjiks, Seyyed, Qizel-Bâsh, transhumant Kuchis

In Behsud, the largest part of the population is Hazâra. Nevertheless, other ethnical groups constitute minorities in the area<sup>12</sup>:

- Seyyed in the valley of Kajab (south of Behsud II)
- Qizel-Bâsh and Seyyed on Bad-Asyab mountainous plateau (south of Behsud I)
- Ismailis in Ab-e-Noqra valley (north of Behsud I down Hadjigak pass) and Kutal Mullah Yaqoub (center of Behsud II)<sup>13</sup>
- Transhumant Kuchis in mountain and hilltops of Kajab, Koh-e-Biroon, Qol-e-Khish, in Dahan-e-Tanoor (Behsud I) and even in the piedmont of Koh-e-Baba, were the pasture they were granted by Abdul-Rahman are located. Some of them own some cultivated lands in various manteqas of Behsud (see part 4.2)

As a result of weak flow and rarity of water, many villages are spread along wetlands and aquifers. Other hamlets are made of stronghold houses built around wells.

### 1.1.3.3 Agriculture and livestock

Agriculture is based on irrigated lands and rain-fed lands (*Lalmi*) for cereals, but this practice is limited as Helmand's riverbed is strongly encased. Snow melting provides additional water to the rare resources of Behsud.

Extensive pastures make important routes for transhumance and are a strong advantage for livestock and small ruminants breeding. Cultivated lands are dedicated to wheat, alfalfa, barley and potato. Harvesting of wild forage crops supplement the fodder reserves used during the 5-months Behsud winter.

## 1.2 Methodology

### 1.2.1 Objective and Scope

GERES, Solidarités International, and MADERA, three French NGOs operating in Afghanistan, have come together to form a consortium and have been funded by the French Development

<sup>12</sup> See map in annex 2. This map is helpful for the reading of this report as it contains the names of the quoted Manteqas. the map is used with the kind authorization of MADERA

<sup>13</sup>Non-exhaustive list of the kind of population we met during the mission

Agency (AFD) to undertake a 3½-year rural development and natural resources management programme in the Central Highlands region of Afghanistan.

The objective of the project is to increase the living standards and quality of life of the rural mountainous populations by promoting balanced rural development and preservation of natural resources.

The project is made up 4 components, as follow:

- I. Support sustainable intensification of agriculture and livestock farming production
- II. Improve energy resilience of households and their living conditions in winter while limiting the depletion of natural capital
- III. Improve access to, and management of, finite natural resources (pastures and water) for the sustainability of the production systems
- IV. Produce knowledge and capitalize on the knowledge acquired within this programme in order to initiate a political dialogue with local authorities and development actors.

The migration study is part of the component IV.

The programme is implemented in a large part of Hazârajat, where the 3 implementing NGO's have a long experience working:

- 3 districts of Bamyan Province (Saighan, Kahmard and Yakawlang)
- 2 districts of Wardak Province (Hissa-e-Awal-e-Behsud, Marzak-e-Behsud)

The “migrations study” is part of the 4<sup>th</sup> component of CHP, and has largely focused on the 2 Behsud districts.

The main tasks of consultant, as described in the call for tender are:

- Describing exhaustively the migration mechanisms and patterns (emigration / immigration / seasonal / permanent) in the areas of intervention;
- Describing exhaustively socio-economic and financial impacts of migration at community level especially on livelihood, agricultural, livestock activities;
- Quantitatively and qualitatively modeling/forecasting impacts of migration at territories level (demography, pressure on resources, social network, remittance);
- Make hypothesis on impacts of project activities on migration and define a pool of indicators to be monitored by the programme

### 1.2.2 Location of the study

The aim of the study is to obtain qualitative information about the question of migrations. Actually, the timeframe proposed by GERES (up to 4 weeks) did not allow an accurate quantitative analyze with a significant sample. It has to be mentioned that both districts of Behsud cover a large area, equivalent to some afghan provinces (for instance Kunar, Paktia or Kapisa). The geography and the difficulty to access some areas because of poor roads conditions are also factors that do not allow a proper statistical analyze in such a short timeframe.



Therefore, sampling has been based on geography: both Behsud districts have been shared in sub-entities, fitting with the *manteqas*<sup>14</sup> defined by MADERA for its activities:

- Janum / Ab-e-Noqre on the south side of Hadjigak pass (Bamyan road)
- Gardan Dewar, in the east of Behsud I (Uluswal of Behsud I)
- Manteqas along Helmand river (right side) : Abdara, Pul-e-Afghanan, Ab-e-Shiroom, Qotal Mullah Yaqoub,
- The valley of Koh-e-Biroon
- The southern part of Behsud : Dahan-e-Rishqa, Sorkh Abad, Bad Asyab, Kajab-e-Bala

*It has to be underlined that the choice of the driver has been an important part of the study and has helped to draw accurate information. It may appear anecdotal or without any importance. Nevertheless, we insisted with GERES and MADERA to make available Mr Chaman Ali. In addition to his real quality for driving cars in bad road conditions, his long working experience in MADERA grants him a great knowledge of all Behsud I and II area.*

*Moreover, he is known by many communities and villages. His advice has been precious when traveling in the area, and he ensured the first contact with villagers when we arrived. This *modus operandi* allowed us to enter households in a trusting and serene climate, as we were seen as MADERA employees, working in the area for a long time and well-known in the communities. This might appear as a detail, but on a cultural point of view a proper introduction within communities, he had an outweighing role in the execution of the field investigation.*

Lastly, the period for the field survey and travel had been precisely chosen at the end of August – beginning of September. Actually, the summer end is the harvest time for the main crops found in the area:

- animal fodder: alfalfa and barley
- subsistence crops : wheat and potatoes

Accordingly, all family members were working outside: women for harvesting, men in preparing animal fodder storage for the winter; it made things easy to enter in contact with people and “organize” improvised meetings with them. When one reaches this kind of remote villages in Afghanistan, and that one is travelling with a familiar person in the area (in this case, our driver), men always come to you for salutations and taking information about your visit. Even if it cannot be taken as a real ethnographic characteristic, it has to be mentioned that Hazâras people are an open-minded community and it is generally easy to create a proper climate for discussion.

Bazaar and commercials area along the main Behsud road have also been interesting to prospect. Different classes of people are found in those places: shopkeepers, restaurant owners, craftsmen (particularly ironsmith of Foladi in Ab-e-Shiroom area), pump attendant. We also have to underline the fact that those people have all a link with agriculture as they

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<sup>14</sup> See Terms and Definitions

own lands and animals in addition to their commercial activity. In this case, animals are mostly dedicated to household consumption and not to commercial purposes.

The para-veterinary network of MADERA was also a good source of information. Set-up in the area for 15 years for the first ones, and 2 to 3 years ago for the most recent, the nature of their activity makes them good observers of human activity: living conditions, economic activity, evolution of the infrastructure, demography etc. and of course migrations.

A particular attention has been paid in interviewing members of educative community. Schoolteachers have been met in various areas, in the morning just before beginning classes, or at lunch time. In contact with the kids of their area, they are witnesses of the communities' liveliness.

The research has also been undertaken in places outside Behsud districts. Bamyan, the capital of Bamyan province, is the city where the ratio of Hazâras in the total population is the highest in the country<sup>15</sup>. Bamyan is also the economic capital of the region: since the fall of Talibans, economy picked up very quickly. This vigor might be explained by main 2 factors:

- a relative secure situation compared to many other areas of the country (particularly south and east)
- Its location on the central road connecting the east of the country (and the Indian sub-continent) to the western part of the country and Iran. If the southern ring road is in better<sup>16</sup> conditions, the security issue leads a part of the commercial transportation to use the central road.

Consequently, Bamyan city is attractive for migrants who leave the most remote districts. In the last 15 years, the city has significantly grown, and many settlements of migrants have been created around the city. For instance, the areas of Naw Abad (Shahr-e-Zohaq), in the east, and Sorkh – Qôl, on the Yakawlang road, have been quickly settled as they have been built by / for migrants.

A part of the study took place in Kabul city for two reasons:

- I. **The district 13**, located in the south-west of Kabul and named Dasht-e-Barshi, has been established by Hazâras nearly 20 years ago. The fact of joining people from the same family or ethnical origins is a proved and logical side of migrant's behavior. For this reason, numerous people leaving Hazârajat for Kabul are installed in this particular neighborhood; actually, both shuras of Kajab and Behsud are located in Dasht-e-Barshi<sup>17</sup>.
- II. Kabul is the **politic and administrative** center of the country. Kabul University is the most important of the country and hosts academics and intellectuals. It was then a major concern to focus on the capital to get a global overview on the questions of migrations in the south-east part of Hazârajat.

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<sup>15</sup> Many other ethnic groups, even though with a lower importance, live in Bamyan: Pashtuns, Tadjiks, Seyyed and Qizel-Bâsh.

<sup>16</sup> The works and improvements on this central roads (and on Behsud road, see part 3.3 hereunder) will likely strengthen that trend

<sup>17</sup> If Shuras can be found in the field, it is current to find the most important people, and then the real shura, in Kabul (or in Pakistan during the war against soviets)

A dialectic approach, with feedback between the investigation at a territory level and the ideas of politics and institutions, has guided us to implement the survey and confront the points of view.

### 1.2.3 Sampling, making contact

*We decided not to be trapped in a specific or minimum number of people to interview. It has happened many times that we interviewed one or two people only, to enjoy an unmasked discussion. It was particularly the case in small villages or when we met with acquaintances (for instance some of the para-vets supported by MADERA). However, in villages or bazaars, we tried to gather many people to have interesting focus groups.*



Focus group in Sya Khâk, Surkh Abad area

A bias of organized, forecasted interviews in Afghanistan is sampling: when you request somebody in advance to gather people in order to have an open discussion, it is systematic that community leaders will belong to the group. They generally are the first and the last one speaking. Their predominance in the discussion may sometimes slow or shut down contradictory opinions. For this reason, and in order to meet people without this politic context, decision has been taken to sample interviewees “by chance”.

A focus group is an informal assembly of people whose opinions are requested about a specific topic. The goal is to elicit perceptions, feelings, attitudes, and ideas of participants about the topic. As described above, both Behsud districts have been shared in number of manteqas, that we reached by car. We could visit one or two manteqas by day. During the trip, random sample have been made following our visual impressions: along a riverside; village with houses that look empty/in bad conditions, or, on the contrary, that appears inhabited by a lot of people; schools; bazaars.

Contacts were thus taken with the closest person to the car, always men. As mentioned above, many people were found outside thanks to harvesting season. The driver, well known in many communities, generally introduced us this person, when we did not know anybody in the village.

We then requested to this person to gather some other people of the village to have a discussion about agriculture and breeding issues (the field of intervention of the NGOs in the area). We always required an experienced man (“ke pokhta shâda”), an old man (white beard) and a young man, when this configuration was possible to obtain. Gradually, and taking opportunity of a sentence or topic, we could reach the main point, i.e. the question of migrations in the area.

Other meetings have been a bit more organized. Through our network in Kabul, we had the opportunity to meet the shuras of Behsud and Kajab in Dasht-e-Barshi (district 13), to have an interview with the Dr Sayed Askar Mousavi, and to arrange a meeting with Mr Karim Khalili<sup>18</sup> and Mohammad Moaqqiq<sup>19</sup>. We also received great help from GERES collaborators to arrange meetings with IOM and UNHCR in Bamyan.

This sampling allowed us to discuss with 107 different people, including 27 focus groups with people in the field (Behsud, Bamyan). The objective was to reach people from various social categories:

<b>TYPE OF INTERVIEWEES</b>	<b>NUMBER</b>
NGOs responsible and workers	8
People in the field	84
Academic	1
Community leaders - Shura	12
Politics	2
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>107</b>

Table 1: Type of interviewees

For this purpose, many places have been visited in the three areas:

<b>LOCATION</b>	<b>NUMBER OF VILLAGES OR PLACES</b>
In Behsud	24
In Bamyan	5
In Kabul	7
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>36</b>

Table 2: Location of interviews

Whenever possible, the objective was also to reach people from various social levels, always with the idea to confront the ideas and opinions:

<sup>18</sup> Former Vice-President of Hamid Karzai

<sup>19</sup> Current Vice-President of Abdullah Abdullah

The group on the picture gathered the tchai-khana owner,

- 1 shopkeeper,
- 1 mechanic,
- 1 mason,
- 4 landowners,
- 1 young employee of the restaurant
- 1 young sharecropper

(Not all shown in the picture).



Focus group: Tchai-khana of Kuttal Mullah  
Yaqub's bazaar

Hereunder an exhaustive list states the occupation of interviewees

- **Landowners** : most of those living in Behsud also work on their land
- **Dehqan** (farmers or sharecroppers)
- **Shopkeeper**, easy to find on the Behsud main road all along Helmand river
- Various **manual workers** (mechanic, masons etc.)
- **Teachers**
- **Doctors**
- **Animal health workers**
- **NGO employees**
- **Academics**
- **Community leaders**: shuras of Kajab-e-Bala and from Behsud in Kabul,
- **Politics**
- **International organizations**: UNHCR and IOM heads of office in Bamyan

#### 1.2.4 Semi-structured interviews and questionnaires

A semi-structured methodology has been preferred to a precise questionnaire.

The semi-structured interviews are conducted with a fairly open framework that allows for focused, conversational, two-way communication. They can be used both to give and receive information.

Unlike the questionnaire framework, where detailed questions are formulated ahead of time, semi-structured interview starts with more general questions or topics. Relevant topics (breeding, agriculture etc) are initially identified and the potential relationships between these topics and the issues (i.e. migrations) become the basis for more specific questions which do not need to be prepared in advance.

Not all questions were designed and phrased ahead of time. The majority of questions were created during the interview, allowing both the interviewer and the person being interviewed the flexibility to probe for details or discuss issues.

Semi-structured interviews are guided only in the sense that some forms of interview guides, such as a matrix<sup>20</sup> is prepared beforehand, and provides a framework for the interview.

This methodology is particularly efficient in those remote areas, as it contributes to create a trusting atmosphere and abolish the notion of interviewer (who is looking for answers) and interviewee (who is supposed to provide the correct answers). A more open discussion takes place, where the searcher can bring smoothly the concerned topics.

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<sup>20</sup> Made up with 4 main research topics described at the end of point 1.3.1

## 2 Migrations in Behsud

### 2.1 Causes of migrations

For Hazâras people, being a migrant is almost written in the DNA. There is a long tradition of migrations in the area and it appears that this tradition is still taking place in the mind of Hazâras. We can identify three explanatory factors:

- The origin of Hazâras people: as explained previously, their origin is still not clear and various theories exist. However, it is accepted by all that this origin can be explained by people's movements and migrations in Central Asia.
- Secondly, there has been a tradition of people's displacements due to repressions against Hazâras in the country: Hazâras then became used to leave and sometimes come back in their native area
- Finally, there is an important tradition of seasonal migrations favored by economy and climate: the winter is long; snow and cold do not allow outdoor working. Accordingly, a lot of people left Hazârajat to work in the cities or in Pakistan during the winter. We can quote Monsutti :

*“Before the soviet coup in 1978, seasonal migrations concerned 30 to 50% of men in the poorest villages [of Hazârajat]”<sup>21</sup>[our translation]*

Migrations seem then logical and traditional for the communities of Hazârajat; despite the fact migrations may be linked to cyclical reasons, some of the migrant's motivations are fully structural and part of the identity of the people. This always has to be kept in mind to avoid a partial understanding of the situation and of this study.

This may be enlightened by the conclusion of Monsutti about the “migration as life principle”:

*“Through the study of individual life trajectory and familial strategies, we can figure out that very few afghan people never left their countries in the [35] past years, and rare are the ones who never came back at least one time for short visits. There are continuous comings and goings (raft o âmad). The image of the refugee, compelled to leave his land due to a threat overwhelming him, is far away from this statement. The quoted reasons to leave their lands are various and often overlay [...] My main objective is not to enlighten so much those motivations, but rather to take notice of the existence of migratory routes and to draw from the analyze the individual and familial strategies. [...] Migration became a real life principle”<sup>22</sup>[our translation]*

Although it has already been mentioned in the historical part, it is primordial to keep in mind that in the recent history, Hazârajat has known three periods of important migrations, or even better said **exceptional “mass exodus”**. It is interesting to mention them as comparison points when we want to have indications on the importance of current migrations:

- The tough 2-year repression (1891-1893) by King Abdul Rahman (Cf. 1.2.2)

<sup>21</sup> Alessandro Monsutti, *Guerres et migrations, réseaux sociaux et stratégies économiques de Hazâras d’Afghanistan*, éditions de l’Institut d’Éthnologie de Neuchâtel, éditions de la maison des sciences et de l’homme de Paris, 2004, p. 90.

<sup>22</sup> Alessandro Monsutti, op.cit., p. 186

- The great famine in 1971
- Taliban time (also broached above)

*To the question “how many people have left your village in the past years?”, all people answered referring to before and after Taliban time, showing the trauma that this period was. Quite all places have lost many families in those days:*

- *In Seyyed villages of Khâgi Agha: 25 families before Talibans, 10 after their departure*
- *In Donga (Manteqa of Sang-e-Shanda): 76 families before, 17 remaining after*
- *In Jây Zangy (Manteqa of Sang-e-Shanda): 180 families before, 110 after*
- *In Khâna Sultan Village (Kajab): 140 families before, 30 after*
- *In Dahan-e-Bedak (Abdara): 12 families before, 3 after*

Mr Mir Agha Nasrat explained that there were actually 4 reasons for migrations:

- Economy: poverty plays an important role in the migrations strategies
- War
- natural disaster
- the consequences of development

During the mission, we also acquired the conviction that education is an additional important determinant of migrations. It defines new behaviors in the “raft o âmad” of movement described by Monsutti.

Nowadays in Behsud, we could identify 4 reasons for migrations:

- I. **Economy** is clearly the first reason mentioned by the people met all along the road. The geography has a strong impact on the lack of cultivated lands. Every single source of water is exploited for agriculture purposes. However, not all families own lands, and generally the poorest families (i.e. those who don't own lands) leave first. However, even if it is marginally in the situations we faced, it has to be mentioned that poverty may be, in some case, the result of political issues.

*For instance, Mr Aziz<sup>23</sup> used to own land in Dare-Muchak<sup>24</sup> (place with recent settlements) Kuchis owned some lands in the area and came back to claim their property after war. This person wanted to stay on the land, and made a grab<sup>25</sup> to pay the Kuchis to get the land*

<sup>23</sup>The name has been changed on his demand

<sup>24</sup>North-west of Kuttal Mullah Yaqoub in Behsud II

<sup>25</sup> See terms and definitions



*property rights. It cost him 100 sheep and 70 ser of wheat<sup>26</sup>. A financially more-secure neighbor “took the grab” (loaned the money) and the right to exploit the land until the total reimbursement of the debt. As working as a sharecropper in his own land was not enough for Mr. Aziz to reimburse the debt, he went to Bamyan, where he has been given a home in Naw Abad by UNHCR and is now working as guard in the clinic to reimburse the money to his neighbor.*

- II. **War** is the second reason of migrations: despite the fact that the conflict with Kuchis that arose in 2007 cannot be named a war due to its seasonality (generally in spring and beginning of the summer) and limited area (Kajab Valley), people suffer the same consequences caused by war. Among 1,200 families living in Kajab valley, 360 families have been displaced in 2011; 200 in 2012; 180 in 2013<sup>27</sup>.

*Mohammad Younoss is the para-vet of Kajab-e-Bala. He took the example of his own village to describe the situation: 140 houses remained in “Khâna Sultan” after Talibans time. Nowadays, only 30 houses are inhabited. If some inhabitant flee to bordering villages (in the manteqa of Bad Asyab for instance), most of them have left to Kabul. Proximity of the city and the hope to find work thanks to the familial network led many people to choose the capital as a destination.*

- III. **Education** is one of the new phenomena stated in recent years, and thus not completely described in the literature (Mousavi or Monsutti). Young people are leaving Behsud to attend university and be educated. The meeting with Dr Mousavi pointed a fact that is now largely accepted in political field: Hazâras people now use education as a way to climb social ladder. The fact that Pashtun people have generally less access to education in many eastern or southern provinces province (burnt schools, girls not allowed to study, business opportunities etc.) confers them a secondary role at Kabul University, the reference in the country. Less than 5% of people succeeding the admission test are Pashtun people, which is considerably low compared to their proportion in global population (around 40%).

Hazâras people then constitute an important part of students. Education is a field that has been totally opened to them after 2001 and the importance to go to school and even after to university is spread even in the most remote places of Behsud. In Chaghatian (Manteqa of Sorkh Abad), a landowner had 2 out of his 5 children studying in Kabul, where they are hosted and receive help from their family.

<sup>26</sup>Regarding the current price in the country, this amount represents nearly 720,000 AFS (around 11.250 USD).

<sup>27</sup>Briefing notes on Behsud situation, UNHCR – FU, March 2015. The available figures between 2008 and 2011 take into account other areas than Kajab (Daï Mirdad for instance). The exact figure for Kajab is thus not quantifiable. However, it is sure that many families also flee at the beginning of the conflict as Kajab is the frontline.

- IV. **Islam** is the last key element to understand the migrations process of Behsud: regarding the Islamic law, the capital of a father who dies should be equitably shared between the brothers. Due to limited surfaces, and in order not to dismember the family lands, the family choice is often to let one child in the area to work the land, while the others leave Behsud to join Kaboul, Ghazni or Iran for some of them. The modalities for transferring the use of the land within the same family (brothers generally) are usufruct, sale of the part to the staying brother and sharecropping.

Lastly, the question of new technologies has also been mentioned by some young people. However, it is difficult to consider it at 5<sup>th</sup> reason as it has been really marginally evocated (in only one village).

## 2.2 Typology of migrants

In almost all the visited places, no matter the social level or economic situation, people answer “young men” when asked who are the migrants. It is clearly the first category of people leaving, and it is not really surprising as the movement of young men has been well described in the literature: young men leave for work first, and more recently for education, as described above.

Young women never leave alone, they generally do after they get married. They are really less concerned by education than men, so do not contribute significantly to young people’s migrations. There are two cases, regarding the situation of the husband: either he lives in Behsud, and most of the time the family will remain in the area (except for the reasons mentioned in point 2.1). Or he lives “abroad” (Kabul, Ghazni, and Iran) and his wife will leave Behsud and join him.

*The question of teenagers leaving in European countries is also an important part of migrations. However, AREU and UNHCR published in 2014<sup>28</sup> a study about the topic, and showed that the high sending areas of unaccompanied Hazâra children were Kabul and Ghazni. Bamyan was located in the low-sending areas. By extension, it may be asserted that Behsud also is a low-sending area, as people did not mention the phenomena. It appears that Kabul is always a first step for entering the smugglers networks and trying to flee to Europe.*

Rich people, meaning the one who have lands and animals, generally do not leave Behsud. Their sons usually leave for education (high school or university).

In very few cases migrations concerning entire families were stated. We already presented the security situation in Kajab that pushed hundreds of families to leave. It has similarly been the case when family used grab to reimburse debts (economy) or when a family becomes too large for the production capacity of lands.

Our observations in field helped us to elaborate the following table, which presents the potentiality of people to migrate regarding their type of economic activity. Of course, it is a just a trend: the “potentiality of migrations” does not take into account exceptional occurrences, but rather depicts the situation perceived.

<sup>28</sup>Why do children undertake unaccompanied journey ?; C. Echavez, J. Bagaporo, L. Pilongo, S. Azadmanesh; AREU-UNHCR; December 2014

MIGRATION BY TYPOLOGY OF PEOPLE	DESCRIPTION	MIGRATION'S POTENTIAL
Shop-keepers Important landowners	This category gathers 2 types of people: the one holding a business (tchaikhana, pump station, shop...) and the landowners who have large land (more than 5 djeribs). All the first ones have lands and usually do not work it themselves: dehqan or farmers generally do.	+
Teachers owning lands	Despite the low level of government salary, it is an additional income for teachers, who generally also have land. <i>Dehqan</i> or family members work on their land.	+
Small landowners - Sharecroppers	They have small lands (less than 1 or 2 <i>djeribs</i> ) and have additional income working on other people's land. They own tools that they use when working on someone else's land	++
Sharecroppers	Their only income is working on someone else's land. They own tools and sometimes bring other inputs when working on someone else's land	+++
Farmers	Their only income is working on someone else's land. They do not own tools and cannot bring any material. They receive a lower part of the crops than sharecroppers.	+++

Table 3: Migration's potential regarding social level

It can also be summarized by the sentence of Mr Wafa, UNHCR head of office in Bamyan: *"look at me : I have a good job, the security situation is good in Bamyan, I have no reason to leave my region or my country, contrary to number of those migrants."*

### 2.3 Destinations of migrations

According to the interviews, the main destinations are the following:

- **Kabul** is the first destination for migrants. The city is very close<sup>29</sup> and improvements of roads make the journey easier even if it is not the safest as many problems occur on the road in Jalrez area<sup>30</sup>. It is also easy to come back quickly if exceptionally needed. On top of that, people going to Kabul can easily monitor the lands they left to farmers or sharecroppers. The recovery of economy in Kabul thanks to international aid is another reason to choose Kabul. It was easier, until recent time, to find job for daily workers in main cities<sup>31</sup>.
- **Iran** is the second destination. It is part of an ancient tradition of young men to go and work some years in Iran, before coming back when they gathered enough money for wedding or other projects. According to the manteqas, we can estimate that 10 to 20% of people leaving now go to Iran.

<sup>29</sup> We again have to underline the location of Behsud, on south side of Koh-e-Baba

<sup>30</sup> From 2.5 to 7 hours to rally Kabul, regarding the starting point in Behsud. The travel costs between 500 and 1,000 AFS

<sup>31</sup> However, this trend may change in the future: many families (see point 2.4) came back from Kabul to Behsud because of the bad economic situation in last 2-3 years

- **Ghazni** is another possible destination for Hazâra people, as it presents the same characteristics than Kabul (kind of economic dynamism until recently, proximity, presence of family etc.)
- **Bamyan** similarly attracts people, although the phenomenon is more recent. Sorkh-Qol valley has been quickly settled, and we can estimate the number of Behsudi families living in the inner suburbs of Bamyan to 300. Most of them arrived in last 3-4 years and are young families without lands. The recent increase of economic activity due to the works on Behsud road<sup>32</sup> and diversion of traffic through Bamyan is an explanation



In sorkh-Qol. The migrants from Koh-e-Biroon are daily workers in the bazaar; the days they don't find work are dedicated to build their houses

*Mir Agha Nasrat, of Bamyan's IOM, also pointed out a movement concerning some Behsud families in Bamyan: the first step of their migration was to join Kabul. As they unfortunately did not find any job or occupation, they then came back in Hazârajat, but in Bamyan. This is explained by the fact they do not have land in Behsud and then tried their chance in Bamyan. The conclusion, said by Mr. Nasrat is that "they cannot be considered as IDP's or refugees and it is then difficult to help them as if they were".*

- **Pakistan** is another destination, but is less marked than we expected. There is a significant presence of Hazâras in Quetta since 1878, lying on historical reasons :  
*"Hazâras are present in Quetta since the end of XIX<sup>th</sup> century. "They sought refuge in territories free of the authority of Kabul's Emir, either in Qadjar's Persia, or in British India"<sup>33</sup>[our translation]*
- **Developed countries.** When they try to flee in developed countries, it appears that Hazâras usually aim at migrating to Australia or Indonesia. The part of Hazâras is less important than other ethnic groups in Western Europe.

We also could draw a typology of migrations regarding the departure area; this is a trend that would require to be scientifically proven. However, it seems that the people of the north of the districts (Koh-e-Biroon, piedmont of Koh-e-Baba) leave to Bamyan. It may be explained because they are from very remote areas, and may be reluctant to go to a huge city like Kabul where they may not have family or relatives. The proximity of Bamyan, allows an easier return

<sup>32</sup> See point 4.3.

<sup>33</sup> Alessandro Monsutti, Op.cit., p 137

for short periods (like religious celebrations) than if they were located in Kabul (accessibility is a major stake in Hazârajat).

Lastly, it appeared that the familial migratory phenomenon was more significant in the areas connected with accessible roads: the region of Abdara, villages next to the main road, etc. It can be explained by the fact that the road brings new goods and create new needs in the population. It might have consequences on the indebtedness of families and the decision to migrate: indebted people then make a grab for their lands. Doing this, they lose their main source of livelihood and leave to the cities to work there and reimburse the grab. Contrary to that, it seems that migrations are not so important from the most remote areas, like Koh-e-Biroon, Sorkh Abad. For instance, in Ghawas village of Koh-e-Biroon, only 2 families out of 50 have left in the last three years, and the seasonal migration system is still used in the same way than before.

We will explain this seasonality of migrations in the following part.

## 2.4 Temporalities of migrations

Qualifying migrations as “definitive” is complicated in the frame of the study. For sure many people during the last decades have left the area and will probably not return. It is likely the case for the people we met in Sorkh-Qol around Bamyan: they confirmed that they had no plan to come back to Behsud, as long as they have no land. Now, the notion of time (and to accept the length of time) is important to understand. We met with people who left Behsud nearly 10 years ago... but their behavior makes think that they have a plan for coming back.

It is typically the case of Mr. Aziz in Naw Abad, waiting with patience to reimburse the grab for his land before returning (staying in the houses given by UNHCR may then be seen as speculation in this way). It is the reason why it is difficult to say that this or this family will never come back.

A good indicator is to verify if the families who had land when they left sold it or not. The families that left the area in high number during Taliban time and have not so far returned still keep the property of the land. Of course they receive a part of harvesting, but people told us that it is also part of the migrant’s strategy.

About seasonal migrations, the general impression (confirmed on other hand by the further development of this study) is that the model is completely changing. This could be one of the most important changes that we noticed. We saw that, in the past, seasonal migration was typical of Behsud. Since long time, men moved to big cities in fall and winter to work<sup>34</sup>, and then came back in spring and summer to work the land with their family. Nowadays, it appears that young men do not come back so often during the harvest period. We identified two main causes of this modification:

- I. In the last 2-3 years, the international development aid has gradually decreased. It is then more complicated to find job for the economic seasonal migrants; young men are then compelled to stay longer in the cities for this purpose, and do not come back in Behsud because they could not bring money at home. This situation has been described many times during our trip.
- II. We already mentioned education as a major change for Hazâra population and as a cause of migrations. University alumni are generally aged 18-27. This age group was in

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<sup>34</sup> Coal mines of Quetta, daily work in Kabul or Ghazni

the past involved in seasonal migrations. Owing to the timeframe of afghan university: the academic year goes from March to November and it is now complicated for those young people to come back for harvest period<sup>35</sup>.

This change is of importance. It is a common opinion in Behsud's people's minds that the representation of this age group has substantially decreased in the total population in the last 10 years. It is the most important difference compared to the situation described by Monsutti or Mousavi.

Lastly, we also stated a returning movement in some areas of Behsud. For instance, in Donga village (Sang-e-Shanda) that counted 17 families last year, 3 entire families came back from Kabul this year. In Jây Zangy (110 houses), nearly 5 families came back in last two years. Even in Kajab, where fights have been really tough last 6 years, some families are now coming back. In the village of the para-vet Mohammad Younouss, it is 5 families (out of 30 still in the village) which came back this year. In all Manteqas, this phenomenon occurs in spring time, to prepare the land for agriculture.

We could identify 2 reasons for returning:

- I. The already described **slowdown of Kabul economy** in the last 2-3 years forced many people to come back in Behsud, as it was impossible for them to make their living in the capital. Most of the families who had lands did not sell them, but let to the local farmers on the principle of share-cropping. For the ones who did not have land, they came back in their villages to propose their working force, in the cultivated areas or for some other works<sup>36</sup>. Those movements also validate the idea that talking about definitive migrations is difficult in the Behsud context: most of the returned families flee the area years ago, but kept their assets in the area, what was useful when they came back.
- II. Secondly, the **improved security in Kajab area** has been determining for the returning of recent IDPs: this summer 2015, people in Kajab set up militias that defend the area and did not allow the "Kuchis" fighters to enter Kajab valley as they did in the past few years.

Lastly, a return to Hazârajat may also be a part of wider migration process: in Donga, some families came back in the village because they had sold all their goods and assets. Doing this, they could gather money to support the project of one member of the family to leave Afghanistan and travel to European countries. The interview of Dr Mousavi also enlighten this process: an important number of Hazâras families in Kabul sold their houses and cars to send a member of the family abroad<sup>37</sup>; he also confirmed that many of them who remained with no goods in Kabul chose then to come back in Hazârajat.

Those families generally did not sell their land: they let them to their relatives or neighbors, who use to cultivate them and share the harvest. The sharecropping system is detailed in the section 3.2.2.

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<sup>35</sup> The summer break is too short to allow them and be significant help for agriculture

<sup>36</sup> On this topic, see part 3. For economic and social consequences of migrations

<sup>37</sup> Following the information gathered in Behsud and Kabul, the estimate cost to flee to Europe is around 20,000 to 22,000 US Dollars. This cost rose by nearly 40% because of the "migrants crisis" in Europe at the beginning of 2015

## 2.5 Intermediary conclusion

As a conclusion of this first part and the migrations process described, we may put forward the following facts:

- We can conclude that a mass exodus does not happen in Behsud, and the current migratory strategies cannot be compared to the important migration movement in Hazâra history. This has also been confirmed by the shuras of Kajab and Behsud, so as by political leaders.
- Some specificities of Hazâras migrations as described in the literature at the end of XX<sup>th</sup> and beginning of XIX<sup>th</sup> century still exist (young people for work, conflicts, migration as a way of life). Migrations for work last more than the winter season because of the recent economic difficulties.
- It seems that here is a major trend in migration process of Hazâras people: migrants of the same family are not sent in the same places. We faced this situation with almost all our interviewees (nearly 80%). In brotherhoods, there is always one brother (or son of landowner) staying in Behsud. The others are spread in different afghan cities, Iran and sometime European countries. It may be part of the migration strategy, or, to put it in other way, Hazâras avoid putting all their eggs in the same basket
- Pakistan is a less interesting destination, except when it is used as a transit to Iran border<sup>38</sup>: it may be due to the recovery of Kabul economy in years 2005-2012.
- We pointed out new a phenomenon (migration for education) that particularly involves young men (18-27). It has impacts on Behsud's society and economy. Those impacts (and the ones of migrations generally speaking) are outlined in parts 3 and 4 of this study.

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<sup>38</sup> It appears that the border is easier to cross for Hazâras people through Baluchistan than through Herat / Mashhad border.

### 3 Migrations: socio-economic causes and consequences

#### 3.1 At a social level



School kids of the Koh—Biroon school's morning shift

The transformation of the age pyramid in Behsud is the first impact of the migration process. This should be detailed and confirmed by a statistical study. Nevertheless, it really appears that children are numerous in all places we visited. It has also been stated, in all schools visited, that the number of school kids increased in last 3 years:

- 150 kids in Abdara – Sar-e-Tala school, around 10% annual increase last 2 years
- 350 school kids in Koh-e-Biroon, also increasing for 2 years
- 450 school kids in Gardan Dewar, out of around 900 people living in the village

Of course, the growth in the number of school kids is not an evidence of the rejuvenation of Behsud's population. It may also be linked to the enhancement of the education as an important principle of Hazâras. However, interviewees also underlined that sanitary structures development in Behsud had a major role: despite the still very partial coverage of human clinics in Behsud, the enhancement of health service last decade contributed to reducing the children morbidity and mortality.

In our mind, the situation of Behsud's education system is then linked with migrations: it shows the vitality of the society and is an indicator supporting the idea that there is no mass exodus in Behsud I and II. If it was the case, there would probably not have so many children in schools, and the figure would not increase year after year.


The underrepresented group of young men also directly impacts an important part of the social linkage in the area i.e. Ashhâr. The community work was based on the number of days given to help relatives or neighbors. This number of days was then credited to the helper, who on his turn received help of his "debtor". It could concern pear-to-pear support for harvesting, working in the lands so as to realize refurbishment or improvement of houses. But it is also used for community work, like building water reservoir, refurbishing the village roads or paths etc. This is a typical process in different countryside around the world. The decrease of young men's presence seriously harmed the system as working force is consequently not available.

It is also linked to the introduction of market economy, cash-for-work programs, or, to summarize it, the monetization of Behsud.



In many places and villages, people answered that this practice has disappeared; notably in the following areas: Abdara, Dahan-e-bedak, Kutal Mullah Yaqoub, in the villages close to Markazi in Sang-e-Shanda, Pul-e-Afghanan, Gardan Dewar.

However, it seems that it still partially remains in the most remote areas, in Sorkh Abad (even if as residual), Koh-e-Biroon, on the mountain top of Dahan-e-Rishqa area, in remote villages of Sang-e-Shanda.



Young men of Sar-e-Tala building a barrage in CHP project. They do not have land. Landowners do not use them as farmers as familial plots are very small in the area; they all think about leaving the area after completing their job

The example of Sang-e-Shanda is interesting in this way. In Donga, a remote village in the south of the Manteqa, and that has less access to the road, the practice still exists. It is also a village where people has returned recently; contrary to that, the central part of Sang-e-Shanda, closer from Markazi and thus from the central road, has lost some families last years and Ashhâr has totally disappeared.

It appears then that there is a link between migrations of young men and the decrease of community work. This statement is not a value judgment, but a fact, that has also been stated in France (and other industrialized countries) some decades ago. Same causes, same consequences?

Now, evolutions are not revolutions, and the impact of migrations on local social networks is different at a global level. We are now dealing with the question of identity, and linkages with emigrants (within Afghanistan or abroad) are still strong. All people exactly know where his family members are. All people who were asked were able to give the details of their different family member's location. This is a traditional behavior, described by Mousavi, Monsutti and confirmed by the local population.

Migrations in Behsud are not lived as a trauma by local population, and the consequences at a local level are just an adaptation to the situation. The social link and solidarity networks do not have a geographical basis for Hazâras:

*“Various sources of solidarity and cooperation exist: family plays an important role, of course, but other aspects are also living, like neighborhood relationships. However, we are not dealing with a system of concentric levels,*

*but more subtly, with partly overlapping of different identity registers”<sup>39</sup>[our translation]*

This opinion is also shared by politics, community elders or other authors: it is largely described in Niamatullah Ibrahimī’s study or in Dr Mousavi’s book, that historically rebuild the process of unification in Hazârajat. The relationships between migrants and Behsud’s inhabitants through other solidarity and cultural networks are also proven by the continuation of a traditional money transfer system: the Hawâla. It is an accurate topic to introduce the question of economic impacts of migrations

## 3.2 At Economic Level

### 3.2.1 Hawâla

**Hawâla**, a traditional money transfer system, is interesting due to its position at the crossroads of social and economic topics. The money can be transferred from even other countries to Hazârajat with very few intermediaries, and the system is entirely lying on mutual trust of the people involved. The purpose here is not to detail the entire mechanism of Hawâla. We just have to keep in mind that the sending family (generally in Iran, Pakistan or important afghan cities) send important amount of cash money, that transit between changers and merchants. The money can be many time turned to goods, and then to money again when arriving on the area. Changers manage the exchange rate between various currencies. The complete Hawâla system is described in “War and Migrations”<sup>40</sup>. The persistence of this practice also supports the idea that, despite the numerous movements of people, the social link between people from Behsud still exists.

### 3.2.2 A sharecropping system more in favor of farmers

Another impact on economy is directly based on the supply and demand mechanism. Various theories of prices constitution, from Adam Smith to Marshall and Walras, stress the direct link between the levels of supply and demands. The lack of working force in Behsud is the main reason for a fundamental change in **sharecropping system**.

Until 10 years ago, the sharecropping-system was more beneficial for landowners. Dehqan generally gain 20 or 25% of the crops. The 5 points difference is explained by the status of the dehqan: when he was a **farmer** and brought inputs for owners land cultivation (seeds, tools), he received a fourth of the crops. When he was a **sharecropper**, and could just bring his working force, the part fell down to one fifth.

Currently, we figured out that 90% of the communities we interviewed were practicing an equal share of harvests. It was the case in Sya Sang, Sang-e-Shanda, Sorkh Abad, Kutal Mollah Yaqoub, Pul-e-Afghanan etc, in various parts of both districts, leading us to think that this system became a standard in Behsud, directly linked with the lack of young men to work.

On addition to that, it also appeared that older migrations also played a role in such a process: we mentioned that many families did not sell their land when they flee to Kabul in Taliban times, what was a clear indicator that those migrations were maybe not definitive. So the lands were let to families or neighbors under sharecropping system.

<sup>39</sup> Alessandro Monsutti, op.cit., p 91

<sup>40</sup> Alessandro Monsutti, op.cit., pp 235-238

The owners, in Kabul, could find new sources of income and then provide food from the capital market. Food resources from their homelands became less important to make their living. And so they accepted to share the crops more equally with the people still living in Behsud. At a village level, this way of organizing things was recurrent when this issue was raised.

Economically, this had a positive impact for the “Behsud middle class” of small landowners who complete their income working in neighbor’s field (the third category described in Table 3). Although the area remains in a bad situation regarding poverty standards, it seems that the conditions created by migrations can have a positive impact on this important class of people.

### 3.2.3 Increasing livestock herds

The migrations of young men, combined with other factors, also seem to have modified households economy, as the importance of livestock has slightly increased in last 5 years. The need for wheat probably slightly decreased as seasonal migrants little by little became long term migrants.

The improving track condition made Kabul more accessible. The tarred road that will be completed in a near future will also play a role in shortening the travel. As a consequence, the price of commercial, imported wheat went down. Simultaneously, Hazâras people took in charge animal dealing and transportation. The fee for the transportation of one sheep to Kabul then dropped and is now around 200 Afghanis per animal (nearly half of the ancient price), people of Chaghatian told. Lastly, the support to animal health service also played an essential role in the process. The para-vets field work is well known and well identified by the breeders in the improvement of flock’s health.

The price of a 50Kg wheat flour bag in Behsud is currently attractive: 1,300 AFS (wheat imported from Uzbekistan)

One sheep to be brought in Kabul is sold 7,000 AFS

A family of 8 people uses one bag a month in average. A family can cover the needs in wheat for one year by selling only 2 sheep.

The development of livestock is noticeable in Behsud II (Koh-e-Biroon, Surkh Abad, Bad Asyab) but we also stated an increase of flocks nearly in all areas. This has been confirmed by the breeders themselves: most of them have 2 to 5 additional sheep compared to last year. As the number of animals in a flock is not so important (10 to 15), it is a subsequent increase of 20 to 30%. The para-vet of Sorkh Abad, quickly met on the road, was coming back from a village where he vaccinated flocks from 35 to 55 sheep belonging to the same breeder. Herds of this size surely did not exist 10 years ago.

One hypothesis would be that there are less breeders, but with larger herds, which would not automatically increase the total number of animals has in Behsud. A survey on that precise topic would be interesting to have more accurate information.

Individual herd counting around 17 animals. This figure almost became a standard



Migrations **are probably not the only reason** for the enhancement of livestock and animal breeding in Behsud. But they are for sure part of this process. On addition to that, the result has to be kept in mind for the analysis of social transformations and their consequences on changes in Behsud's economic model: there is a direct consequence on the type of projects to implement to support people still living there.

*At this stage, we have to report the discussions with the Dr Mohammad Issa. He is the former deputy Project Manager for animal health in MADERA. He used to work for a long time in Behsud as such, going there 3 to 4 times a year. He participated in the installation of all the clinics and health posts supported by MADERA in Behsud. His position has changed (provincial coordinator of Laghman for MADERA) and he had not seen Behsud in the last 4 years. Enjoying a national meeting of MADERA PCs in Behsud, he has been travelling quite all along the province. The feedback of his observations fit in with what we stated regarding the situation of livestock and the accurate context to improve animals breeding in the area. This objective and impartial opinion, drawn from days passed in the field, is for us completely reliable.*

## 4 Migrations and Territories

*Impact between migrations and territories is a cause / consequences link that can work in both directions: migrations have impact on territories, development of territories have impact on people movements*

### 4.1 Land tenure

The matter of land tenure has to be approached on two different levels: irrigated land and pasture.

#### 4.1.1 Irrigated land tenure, a cordial system

First of all, the property of irrigated lands is almost entirely in the hands of Hazâras people, be they in Behsud or in Kabul. When they are in Behsud, they work their lands, sometimes in other one's land also, or sometime hiring farmers following the sharecropping system presented above. It seems to be the case in most parts of the northern, western and south-western parts of Behsud. An accurate percentage of lands belonging to Hazâras for the whole area is not available. However, there are some exceptions:

- Around Kuttal Mullah Yaqoub bazaar, some lands belong to Kuchis. They generally acquired the lands at the time of Abdul Rahman, when Hazâras families indebted to buy the products brought by Kuchis merchants.
- It is also the case for the Qol-e-Khish valley. The people of Dahan-e-Laghshem confirmed that Hezâr-Bôz<sup>41</sup> also own many cultivated lands in the area

It seems that there are also Qizel-Bâsh<sup>42</sup> in the south of Abdara (but has to be confirmed)

A fourth exception is Kajab Valley, where the situation is a bit more complicated. As it can be seen on the map in annex 2, Kajab is the area bordering the Pashtun areas of Wardak. It appears as being the buffer zone, where movements of populations were always important. The historical presence of different ethnics groups in Kajab makes the situation of this manteqa more specific:

- In the XVIII<sup>th</sup> century, Qizel-Bâsh troupes were settled by Nader Shah Afshâr of Persia. Descendants of those populations are still owner of some lands, although most of them live in Kabul. They do not have particular problems with the Hazâras regarding the land tenure: Mohammad Younouss, the para-veterinary of Kajab, explained that they share the crops on 50/50 system since long time, and they even grow the part of dehqan to 90% (!) in leaner years. It happens that Qizel-Bâsh help the settlements on their lands in Behsud for Hazâras people who face poverty situations in Kabul.
- A Seyyed village is also settled in the valley gathering around 8% of Kajab total population. The difference with Qizel-Bâsh is that they still live in the village, but the relationships with Hazâras and the modalities of the sharecropping are very similar to the ones Hazâras have with Qizel-Bâsh.
- Kuchis also own cultivated lands in Kajab. They acquired them mostly by taking Grab to Hazâras people, with the same procedures of causing indebtedness and taking possession of lands. It has to be underlined that before the last 8 years and the beginning of fights in this area, the relationship between Kuchis landowners and

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<sup>41</sup> See terms and definitions

<sup>42</sup> ditto

Behsudi dehqans was good and based on mutual agreement. Mohammed Younouss explained to us that he currently was reimbursing a Grab that his father contracted with Kuchis breeders.

In Qol-e-Khish, there is also evidence of these peaceful relationships. The Hezâr-Bôz yearly come to take their part of the crops during the transhumance. Crops are also shared equally, and they also let a more important part to the dehqan (25/75) in leaner years.

This tenure of cultivated lands then appears not so important in the migration process. Marginally, we can find counterexamples, showing that the question of property may have impacted the decision of families to leave: the situation of Mr. Aziz in Naw Abad is typical of the case when Kuchis came back after years of war. Some of them requested the full reimbursement of due amount during the decades of war. They thus caused indebtedness of Dehqan, sometime by contracting Grab, and forced them to leave.

However, it seems that the question of pasture land tenure is more subject to disputes and has been cause of migrations, notably in Kajab.

#### 4.1.2 Pasture land tenure, a pretext for fight

As exposed, Kuchis have been granted huge pasture lands in Hazârajat by King Abdul Rahman. They still possess the *firman*<sup>43</sup> as proof of the property. It is not the case for all Behsud pastures:

- In Koh-e-Biroon, the pastures were occasionally used by the Kuchis. *“There was no modus Vivendi between Hazâras and nomadic breeders, even if the local population may sometime have been bothered by this presence because they were using the weak pasture resources”*<sup>44</sup>. Nevertheless, it never caused any trouble, and the time passing, Kuchis disappeared from this area.
- In Bad Asyab, also close from the buffer zone, Kuchis also cross the pastures belonging to Hazâras. *“There is mutual agreement for this use, as the Kuchis pay fee for that purpose”*<sup>45</sup>. The fee is not monetized, but is made of wool or *qrou*<sup>46</sup>.

Contrary to that, the situation in Kajab is more complex. Since 8 years, fights against Kuchis and Hazâras are attributed to land conflicts. However, the people of the area stated that the Kuchis owning pastures and the people who came to fight are not the same. Local people clearly make the separation between pasture property and the ongoing conflict in Kajab.

Clashes also erupted this year in Qol-e-Khish area, despite the fact that the area had always been peaceful and the relationships between Hazâras and Hezâr-Bôz were satisfying both parts. 10 families out of 25 left their houses in Dahan-e-Laghshem village. However, the speech was the same than in Kajab: the people who came this year to fight and caused people movements were not the owners of lands or do not belong to Hezâr-Bôz tribe.

There is a last source of conflict between Kuchis and Hazâras in the region about pasture lands: the practice of dry farming (*Lalmi*) is a particularly spread in Behsud. The reasons are:

- The lack of surface available for irrigated cultivation due to rarity of water resources

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<sup>43</sup> Royal decree

<sup>44</sup> Quotation of Mohammad Aziz, Mollah of Koh-e-Biroon

<sup>45</sup> Quotation of Engineer Zafar of Donga village – Manteqa of Sang-e-Shanda

<sup>46</sup> Dry creamy cheese

- The fact that Lalmi wheat is of better quality than irrigated wheat: it contains less water, the seeds are more compact. Lalmi wheat is then especially appreciated by local population.

Because of this practice, of the unclear status of land property on Lalmi, Kuchis also reproached to Behsudi people to seriously harm the pasture lands, which is damageable for their grazing animals.

Lastly, all the stakeholders, from the field to the politic level, agree on the fact that the pasture issue is of national interest, and that measures should be taken in order to adapt the law. On their opinion, the solution would be to have all pasture lands nationalized with a public management of rangelands. The implementation of an equal, generalized tax system for people using the pasture and the regeneration of pasture<sup>47</sup> are also mentioned for the preservation of the area.

## 4.2 Agriculture

Visiting Behsud for the first time in 5 years is surprising when you look at the cultivated lands. We made the hypothesis that improvement of herds is linked with the drop of wheat needs in Behsud. The typology of cultures in irrigated lands is an indication in that way.

TYPE OF CULTURES estimation for 100 cultivated plots	IN 2010	IN 2015
Wheat	55	40
Fodder (mostly alfalfa; barley)	40	50
Potatoes	5	10

Table 4: Type of cultures<sup>48</sup>

*In some parts of Behsud, the change is even much more obvious. A landowner in Dasht-e-Myanah (Ab-e-Noqre Manteqa) described his own situation: out of 6 cultivated plots of an equivalent size, the ration is completely balanced: 2 wheat plots, 2 alfalfa plots and 2 potato plots.*

As shown in those two pictures, the visual impression is that “green” areas (alfalfa, potatoes or barley) match or sometime overwhelm “yellow” areas (wheat)

<sup>47</sup> Some projects already are ongoing on that topic, in the frame of CHP, and implemented by MADERA.

<sup>48</sup> Those figures are a rough estimation following our observation and interviewees answers



Manteqa of Sorkh Abad



Valley of Dahan-e-Laghshem

All the interviewed communities confirmed this impression. Messrs Mohaqiq and Khalili had the same feedback from the field about this issue. Many landowners also reported that forage cropping has grown because a part of it can be sold in Kabul. The important number of trucks on Behsud's roads transporting fodder is then easier to understand.

That being said, we can just conclude on a trend and correlations, as it is difficult to draw causalities between migrations and cultivated lands. On addition to that, we cannot ensure that the evolution of lands cultivated with fodder is linked with the general increase of the number of animals in Behsud. It is also part of the most general process described of price decrease and improvement of access to the area.



Now, it has to be taken into consideration by the stakeholders intervening in the area: it may be argued that, with proper security conditions and without exceptional outbreak, this trend could be reinforced in the future, and should be taken into account in the definition of public policies and humanitarian aid.

### 4.3 Communication Channel

The development of communication channels also has an impact on migrations in the area: many households are equipped with a satellite dish and television; access to telephone and internet, through mobile devices, is slowly progressing in the area, although still very marginal. This topic has been mostly mentioned in Behsud I, which has a better coverage area. It has had an impact on the wish for young people to leave the area, as explained by the Dahan-e-Bedak young men.


Secondly, the construction of Afghanistan's central road, crossing both Behsud districts, is of importance when the question of communication channels is raised. Currently, there are not so many ways to cross the country from east to west. Still, the geographical bow linking Pakistan (Khyber Pass) – Jalalabad – Kaboul – Heart is an essential economical axis in the country. It connects the "two parts" of the country<sup>49</sup>: the Central Asia part and Amou Daria Basin in the west and the Indus Basin towards Indian sub-continent in the east.

*The roads crossing Hazârajat have been used since long time, when silk and spices were transported from China / India to Europe. Their use declined particularly after XIV<sup>th</sup> century and dislocation of Mongol empire, because of the danger and complicated conditions, gradually replaced by sea routes.*

Nowadays, the privileged path to rally east to west (and vice versa) in Afghanistan is the southern part of Afghan ring road. Prevailing commercial or travelers movements are enlightened with the map on next page.

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<sup>49</sup>It is important to mention the role of the Hindu Kuch buttresses (and thus of Hazârajat) as a kind of internal border between two distinct geographic, ethnic and cultural areas



Map of Afghan East-West roads<sup>50</sup>

The road in **red color** is the ring road. It is asphalted and is surely the most used, as it avoids the difficult earth relief of the central highlands. Its main inconvenient is that some provinces crossed are among the most insecure in the country; it is particularly true for Zabul, Kandahar, Helmand, Nimroz and Farah. On top of that, the trip from Kabul to Herat may last up to 3 days.

The second main road is the **yellow one**, or Bamyan road. There are two different paths that merge in Shahr-e-Zohaq ("red city", Bamyan province) area:

The northern part of yellow road crosses Parwan province, and the road is now asphalted from Kabul to Bamyan. It is quick enough (Bamyan can be reached in nearly 4 hours from Kabul). However, some security issues may occur in Ghorband valley, in the middle of Parwan province, because of the AOG presence growth.

- The southern part crosses directly Maidan Wardak province, reaches Behsud, climbs Hadjigak pass (at the altitude of 3,800 meters in Behsud I), goes down through Kalou valley and joins the Parwan road in Shahr-e-Zohaq. This junction is marked by the blue circle. The most insecure part of that road is located in Jalrez, just before entering Behsud I district. This area is subject to troubles, unofficial check points and sometime violence against Hazâra users of the road<sup>51</sup>.

The advantage of Bamyan road is that it is much more secure, even if some dangerous areas exist. However, those parts (Ghorband or Jalrez) are much more limited than the ones on the southern ring road. The travel to Herat is however complicated, as many passes have to be crossed, either in Behsud, or in Bamyan province. The last kilometers before the junction with Behsud road are difficult and sometime dangerous.

<sup>50</sup><http://minstrelboy.blogspot.fr/2011/02/map-of-afghanistan-and-ring-road.html>

<sup>51</sup> An international staff of MADERA had also been kidnapped in this area in September 2006



The newly tarred Behsud road

The third road is the one crossing Behsud, and is of interest for this study (**orange route on the map**). Contrary to Bamyan road, the most important part of the paths in Behsud follow Helmand river valley. There is just one pass to be crossed in this way, just before merging the other road in Bamyan province.

It also passes through Jalrez (separation of orange and yellow roads on the map), but the route is much more direct to join Chaghcharan (Ghor province) and then Herat. Nowadays, the road is being asphalted, and works are ongoing in Behsud to do so. When completed, only a day and a half will be needed to reach Herat from Kabul. Those works have impact on migrations in Behsud. We may assert that the completion of the work will also have.

At first, we stated a real impairment of the Bazaar along the road. In Kutal Mullah Yaqoub, where we interviewed number of people (see picture – p.12) people brought information to understand the phenomenon: ongoing works create complication on the road (building of bridges, river diversion works etc.), making it much more difficult to use for trucks. Therefore, an important part of the traffic when this road only was a passable track has been deflected to Bamyan roads.

There is a double consequence on people's movements in the region. It explains the reducing of bazaars, forcing sometimes people to leave, and it may also be one of the reasons for the recent migrations of Behsud people in Bamyan: the traffic has grown there on a principle of communicating vases, strengthening economy and creating employment opportunities in and around Bamyan city.

Now, we also get the information that shopkeeper have not all left Behsud: most of them also own lands and animals; during the works on the road, they also came back to their lands to make their living on it. They will likely come back and re-open the shops when the road will be complete and that the traffic will inevitably take this route, the most direct to cross the country.

On the question of migrations, it will also be interesting to monitor the situation as long as works progress on the road. As road will enhance the economy, It may imply a future return of many Behsud inhabitants who had left the area in last decade. It may also attract new people, not necessary from Behsud or Hazâras, who have means to invest in infrastructures around the road (hotels, restaurants, pump station etc.).

#### 4.4 Industrialization

The north of Behsud offers attractive opportunities for mining prospecting. Large deposits of iron are characteristic on both part of Hadjigak pass, separating Behsud districts from Bamyan province.



Open-pit iron deposit next to Kutal Janum, close to Hadjigak pass

Mr. Wafa of UNHCR provided the information that Indian companies obtained the operations rights for iron mines. It seems that they also gave insurance to respect local population, as long as mutual agreements have been made with Agha Khan, many Ismailis being settled in the area.

The link between industry and migrations cannot be precisely described, the process for extraction having not started already. Though, a special attention has to be paid on the future consequences in the area.

#### 4.5 Pressure on Natural Resources

Firstly, there is a direct link with the supposed consequences of industrialization and pressure on resources.

A bazaar is located at the cross of Bamyan and Behsud roads, in Behsud I<sup>52</sup>. It has slightly grown because of on a first hand, from Kabul to this place, and then from this place to Bamyan, the road is 80% tarred. The traffic thus increased. On a second hand, the creation of stone quarries in this area and the need of working force to crush stones for road construction purpose have brought many people. They settled in this place (10 kilometers in the east of MADERA's base in Abdara) and the consequences on the upper basin of Helmand are already visible: waste (plastic bags, steel boxes and so on) are numerous in the river, much more than it has ever been. It gives an idea of what kind of consequences the completion of the road, the industrialization, and the settlements of people for business around the road may have.

Access to water is a main stake in the area. Building barrages, wells and canals is still an important need for many communities<sup>53</sup>

The returning process may also have consequences on natural resources, even if it is hardly estimable as this process is not significant at the present time. The economic difficulties in

<sup>52</sup> On the road map, this place is located where yellow and orange lines separate

<sup>53</sup> We discussed the issue of the estimated needs with all focus groups. Access to water was the first answer in 70% of the cases (before access to health system)

Kabul combined with the development of the area may bring people back in the area, and this process is also important to follow in the future years.

Lastly, we noted earlier that the management of rangeland and pastures is a major stake for the future of the area and a prelude to the resolution of conflicts. Even more, it is a main environmental stake, as dry farming is a common and appreciated practice. However, consequences on rangelands and all the related issues<sup>54</sup> may be dramatic for animals breeding, which is in our mind the main growth driver and source of income in the future for Behsud.


Most important degenerated pastures are found in the following areas (list is not exhaustive):

- Mountainside of Qol-e-Khish,
- Highs of Helmand valley
- high tops of Sang-e-Shanda



Wheat in rainfed areas – Manteqa of Kotal Mollah Yaqoub

The picture below gives a good indication of the dramatic consequences of lalmi on environment and soil leaching.



Between Ab-e-Shiroom and Kotal Mollah Yaqoub

<sup>54</sup> Erosion; infiltration of water; pasture degeneration etc.

## 5 Conclusion

The migratory phenomenon in Behsud is consistent with Afghan history and culture. Authors, like Bernard Dupaigne, remind that Afghanistan is at the cross-roads of many civilizations. Monsutti and Mousavi depicts the migrations due to wars and conflicts, but also remind that those behaviors are consistent with the tradition and the way of life, and that most of the migrating experiences might not be perceived as a trauma for the people involved.

The situation in the east of Afghanistan (but not only), with individuals and families continually traveling between Afghanistan and Pakistan, also reflects this heritage. The causes and consequences of those migrations are certainly different from the motivations of Behsud people. Nevertheless, they also emphasize the idea that beyond economic or social reasons, migration mainly is a cultural fact.

Now, migrations sometime are forced by terrible events: we underlined that, in the recent history, war and conflicts were the most important causes of mass exodus in the region. It seems that this has not changed today, and that most of Behsud IDPs are families who fled insecure places. It is obvious when we study the situation in Kajab and, since this year, in Qol-e-Khish.

For those reasons, it is useful to remind that the conditions for massive migrations in the areas are not gathered, what has been confirmed, in the field so as at political level. Dr Mousavi definitely exposed the fact that there is an important migration process of Hazâras at a national level, rooted in political issues exceeding the frame of this mission and report.

This being said, we could describe some mechanisms that have changed migrations patterns, often caused by external reasons. Locally, the social structure may be modified, so as the socio-economic relationships between people: the sharecropping system is a central part of those relationships, and it is impossible to stand the idea that it is not a major shift at a local level. Nor will that change harm or threaten the balance of Behsud society.

The social networks do not seem to suffer migrations and conflicts. The course of events at national level changed the modalities or destination of migrants. It also appears that Hazâra people always adapt their behavior consequently, and that solidarity networks (families, relatives, neighbors etc.) cannot be considered as being linked with geographical consideration. The continuation of Hawâla's practice has an economic and a social dimension. It is linked with migrations strategies, stressed by the fact that migration is, most of the time, a decision involving the entire family. Quoted authors also showed that Hazâra identity and consciousness, reinforced in the 1990's, is still living, and is also a cause and consequence of migrations and wars.

Lastly, it also has to be reminded that what we observed is the perception of reality at a given time. Behsud has considerably developed in last 5 years thanks to government (through the NSP) and NGOs interventions. We also depicted process (industrialization, land conflicts) that could change the fact very quickly. Locally, the situation should be monitored to stay connected with the reality in the area.

Understanding the migration process and patterns in Behsud is important for that purpose. If migrations have consequences, public policies so as NGOs intervention must match with the needs in the field. For this reason, the CHP is an asset as the 4 components match with the needs.

The following indicators may be monitored by the project, in order to give indications for a potentially second phase of the project in Behsud:

- Sampling villages in Behsud to follow-up the demographic situation
- Number of children at school, a good indicator to see if people are leaving the area
- Monitoring the typology of cultures in cultivated lands
- Sampling precise household from various areas to follow the evolution of flocks
- Monitor the evolution of roadside bazaars and activity level of shopkeepers (number of shops, estimation of income etc.)